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motivation is, for these emotions, a strong indicator that the emotion itself 
is absent. If the individual feels it, nevertheless, the feeling is a sham" (p. 
330). I find this puzzling. Why can't someone feel mildly indignant over 
some slight, yet remain unmotivated to act, perhaps because of resignation 
or forbearance? I would say that such indignation is mildly felt, yet gen-
uine - not a sham. 
Readers can judge for themselves the merits of Roberts' positions. Let 
me conclude with a final observation. I found several of his examples to be 
politically charged and, at times, offensive. For example, in discussing 
anger, he tells a (presumably imaginary) story about a colleague suggest-
ing that Roberts be given last choice of upper division courses because 
Roberts is II ••• nothing but a middle-aged white protestant male ... " (p. 
60). A woman's unusual rage at a man is explained by reference to her 
monthly menstrual cycle - this is supposed to illustrate that emotions pre-
suppose a background of normal neurochemical functioning (see p. 134). 
Horror is illustrated by asking the reader to consider II A wastebasket of 
human fetuses, some whole and some in parts ... " (p. 202). He continues: II 
... it is even more horrifying if one of them is still moving" (p. 202). 
Perhaps I am being too sensitive about these examples (my monthly 
cycle?), but their content distracts the reader from Roberts' main points, 
which could easily have been made using other cases. To me, these illus-
trations mar an otherwise impressive philosophical contribution. 
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions by Martha C. 
Nussbaum. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 751 pages, inc. 
index. $39.95, cloth. 
GENE FENDT, University of Nebraska 
"'Is that what grief is, then?" I said, II A malfunction?"'! 
Upheavals of Thought is as long and varied as a Russian novel. Fortunately, 
one does not have to read it straight through for fear of losing track of the 
characters. Fruitfully, I took up the assignment of this review at the same 
time that I picked up David Lodge's novel, Thinks ... , in which a female nov-
elist, Helen Reed, is dealing, as Professor Nussbaum while writing her 
book, with that emotion-lisa excessive, so disproportionate to any possible 
evolutionary payoff" (Lodge, 69)-we pin down in the five letters of grief. 
Helen Reed faces her grief against a former philosopher entirely trans-
formed into an adulterous director of an AI institute. Martha Nussbaum 
faces hers in the company of the Stoics and Proust, Joyce and Whitman, 
and against Plato, Dante, Augustine and others. The Lodge novel and the 
scholarly book make the reader consider several thought experiments from 
quite different angles; the novel performs, the scholarly book represents 
and argues; I ruminate: perhaps the scholarly book performs as well .... 
Nussbaum's continuing project is to develop and implement what she 
calls a "cognitive/evaluative" theory of the emotions (3), a theory which, 
II accompanied by a flexible notion of intentionality" (129) will show how 
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emotions "involve judgments ... in which [we appraise] an external object 
... [and] we acknowledge our own neediness" (19), fragility, and vulnera-
bility. More specifically, Nussbaum wishes to exhibit and implement the 
explanatory value of the thesis that an emotion is "identical with the accep-
tance of a proposition that is both evaluative and eudaimonistic" (41). 
"The real, full recognition [of the event] ... is the [emotional] upheaval" 
(45). Since her theory of the emotions is based in a nonlinguistic account of 
cognition, I wonder what will count as judgment (and assent or accep-
tance)-or more exactly what won't count as such; this is particularly prob-
lematic given the admission that there are both non-self-conscious and 
non-conscious emotions (126). Which of these, then, are or involve judg-
ments: A bat chasing night moths? An ameba fleeing the light on a micro-
scope slide? A thermostat turning on the heat when it is cold? Since what 
she means by cognition is "nothing more than 'concerned with receiving 
and processing information'" (23), it seems she must allow all of these have 
cognitive function; perhaps, then, they also all have emotions? And then, 
she adds, "even the best translation [of a judgment into a linguistically for-
mulated cognitive appraisal] an observer can make will involve some 
degree of distortion" (127); but how could this distortion be seen, noted, or 
cognitivelyappraised? Let us not speak of that. 
Her account, the explanation (including its relation to animals), extenua-
tion (into the social and political life) and illustration of which occupy the 
first two parts of the book (about 450 pages), she calls neo-Stoic. That label 
seems to me to be dependent upon a single (and that much modified) 
agreement with the Stoic position that emotions just are value judgments. 
Her view seems to be much more in agreement with Aristotle, though 
Aristotle is not, to my mind, so absolutely unarguably cognitivist as the 
Stoics were or Nussbaum wishes to be. It is tempting to write a review 
merely on these classicist retoolings, about which Nussbaum is always 
worth consulting and frequently insightful or provoking, or perhaps on the 
issues, already adumbrated, which it raises in philosophy of mind. Both 
those reviews would be for different journals. 
The general underlying idea, that the emotions are, "in effect, acknowl-
edgments of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency" (22), would be agreed 
upon by every philosopher in history, though they would differ widely in 
their philosophies of mind, in their accounts of judgment and in how the 
'acknowledgment' of neediness is effected. However, this basic underly-
ing agreement allows Nussbaum, in Part III, to compare the stories several 
artists and philosophers seem to hold about the structure of, and relation of 
several other passions to, that master passion and acknowledgment of our 
insufficiency called love. The remainder of this review will center on that 
last 250 pages, which take their lessons from Plato, Spinoza, Proust, 
Augustine, Dante, Emily Bronte, Mahler, Whitman and Joyce. 
The book Professor Nussbaum has been wanting to write for some time 
is on love; Part III of the present book includes more, and broader, investi-
gation for that book than she has previously published. Naturally, she 
must go back to Plato in order to set up her way through the problem, 
which is "to examine the cures that have been proposed [for the dangers of 
erotic love], to see if they really do the trick of giving us love's energy and 
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wonder without its [ethical] danger" (461). It is not accidental that the 
opening tones of this section of her book repeat the romantic love at first 
sight scene of Proust's Marcel and Albertine on the beach, or that she uses 
Albertine, irregularly, as an evaluator of the various "recurrent attempt[sl 
to reform or educate erotic love" (469). One may, throughout this conclud-
ing section, wish for more regularity and specificity of terms on the one 
hand, and offer conflicting readings of her 'characters' (Plato, Augustine, 
Dante, et al.) on the other. At times these problems overlap. 
For example, after a quote from Kant's (pre-critical) Lectures on Ethics 
Nussbaum points out that while he uses the term "sexual love" it seems 
more accurate to say that he retains both sexual desire (accompanied by 
shame) and human love, eliminating sexual love completely from the well-
lived ethical life" (464, italics original). But it seems that Kant is, even in 
the short quote given, being very exact: "taken by itself and for itself [sexual 
love] is nothing more than appetite. Taken by itself it is a degradation of 
human nature.... Sexual desire is at the root of it" (463, italics mine). In 
contrast to the implication of Nussbaum's footnote (463n), Kant's later criti-
cal distinction between the practical and the pathological does not, it seems 
to me, discount strong emotion of itself, for respect and love of justice 
might be so strong as even to overcome the fear of death; the moral issue 
for Kant is about the root of the passion-is it the freedom of reason, or the 
interest provoked by the lyre-like hips (and the desmesnes that there adja-
cent lie)? The difficulty that must be faced here (in Kant and in the book at 
large) is the question of the connection between substantive (love) and 
adjectives (sexual, human). Kant is very clear about how he means to keep 
these distinctions. It may be that Nussbaum's neo-Stoic point d'appui will 
disallow Kant's distinction at the source, but in any case a book on love 
needs to fix the issue. 
Nussbaum thinks it "plausible to say that erotic love is inseparable from 
some type of sexual desire, meaning by that some kind of desire for inter-
course and other bodily acts. This desire need not be conscious, and need 
not take the form of an actual plan or project" (476). Though such insepa-
rability is contested by a boatload of Christian writers and Socrates 
(though not Aristophanes), she holds that "erotic love cannot be the love it 
is without sexual desire" (476). Such a view need not be an entirely 'from 
the bottom up' (with double entendre) view of the human being-if other 
forms of love are admitted, but it is certainly in accord with modern 
Freudian inversions of Diotima's (or Augustine's, or Dante's) more divine 
view. One might, for the sake of a common starting point, accept 
Nussbaum's "definition of love" as "a particular kind of awareness of an 
object, as tremendously wonderful and salient, and as deeply needed by 
the self" (477) and then distinguish the kinds of awareness, salience and 
need in order to distinguish, say, erotic love from what Kant calls practical 
love, or sexual love from parental love, or any of these from the child's love 
for the parent or any man's for God. It seems likely, under that definition, 
that certain sorts of salience and need imply the project of possession, per-
haps even jealous possession; other sorts of awareness and salience require 
something else entirely. About such distinctions Nussbaum is, unfortu-
nately, vague. 
BOOK REVIEWS 405 
If one accepts such a Nussbaumian definition of love and the concomi-
tant way of making the distinctions among loves, then I think it would be 
surprising to discover that very many of the sorts of love there are meet 
Nussbaum's normative criteria of supporting "general social compassion" 
(479) and "mak[ing] room for and support[ing] reciprocal relationships of 
concern" (480). Most would "recognize and make central the fact that 
human beings are individuals" (480). On the other hand, it seems one of 
her complaints against Plato, namely, that the object of his eros has "a cer-
tain highly general homogeneity" (487), meets those first two normative cri-
teria quite well. Indeed, it seems her complaint would apply to any view 
(e.g. Kant's) which will require love to support general social compassion. 
If one stipulates that erotic love cannot be the love it is without sexual 
desire, for instance, one should not be surprised to discover that as erotic it is 
sans merci; that it is not an "embracing unconditionality" (499), but is (in its 
own understanding) "illiberally perfectionist" insofar as it cherishes its 
objects in accord with their perceived capacity to provoke or answer sexual 
desire. To say, then, that "Platonic thinkers repudiate compassion" or lack 
"respect for the dignity and separateness of others" (527), seems less accu-
rate than to say that eros (lmderstood as Nussbaum defines it) does. 
Of course, to say such a thing of eros is to come closer to the Kantian 
position that taken by itself eros does degrade the person. One might 
avoid this problem with a more generous (or divine) idea of eros, as Plato 
and Augustine do. Under such a view it will be true that the story of "this 
life is not erotic union, but erotic longing, distance, incompleteness" (545), 
but for some reason this version of neediness and fragility seems excessive 
to Nussbaum. Alternatively, one might temper eros by yoking it together 
with a horse of a different color, as Plato in the Phaedrus and Kant do. 
Nussbaum also thinks that the Augustinian ascent requires one who has 
been in love to blind herself "to that person's beauty and power, ... ciose off 
his access to your feelings through habit and memory, and the memory of 
habit, and the habit of remembering" (545). But it seems more adequate to 
understand Augustine's conversion as being from an eros he forges for 
himself in the cauldron of Carthage (following after his own flesh) and so 
one in which he deceives himself about what precisely the beauty and 
power of the other person is, to an eros for that One for whom he was cre-
ated in whom only the true beauty of all other things and persons can be 
truly seen. This is not an ascent in which the Christian becomes "radically 
isolated in her confessional zeal, retreating from the world to be totally 
alone with God" (550). Nor is the equality Augustine sees merely "an 
equality of abjectness, sinfulness, and need. In our common descent from 
Adam, that is to say, in our original sinfulness, is the foundation of our fel-
lowship" (550). Augustine prays not to be purged of affection, or memory, 
or nature, but to be purged in these (e.g. Confessions 4.11.17, 4.12.18); our 
equality cannot be measured in sin (for sin is a lack), but is in our original 
creation as imago dei (e.g., De Trinitate 12 and 14). 
I shall close with a few comments about the ascent which "in some 
ways" is "the most completely satisfying of all" to Nussbaum, which she 
finds in Mahler. If the emotions just are judgments both evaluative and 
eudaimonistic, then Mahler's music, as "the creation of a totality of emo-
406 Faith and Philosophy 
tional expression" (615) must be carrying us along on a stream of such 
judgments. While Nussbaum does not agree with Deryck Cooke that 
music is so language-like that propositions can be formed of it, she does 
find it necessary, in explicating Mahler's ascent, to make considerable ref-
erence to his three "programs" for the Second Symphony, as well as to per-
sonal and social occurrences during the time of its composing. While 
telling a story about a piece of music does require some kind of representa-
tionalism, just as telling the story about an emotion does, it does not seem 
particularly helpful to understand the music itself as representational, or to 
think one is understanding it better as music to be able to tell such a story. 
If we consider Cooke's analogy, the language of music seems to be (unfor-
tunately for Cooke) all syntax, no semantic. So Nussbaum's suggestion 
(against all of Mahler's revised programs) that the symphony is exploring 
"the contrast between the expression of the self in society and its purer and 
richer expression through solitary personal striving" for which "it is crucial 
for it to contain not only the sardonic and grotesque account of society that 
the third movement will provide, but also a reminder of society at its 
best-... the first movement" (623), gives us a clear and cleverly wrought set 
of representations to consider along with the music, but that the music is 
about this intentional history in any way seems simply an outrageous 
claim. I very much enjoyed Walt Disney's original version of "Fantasia"-
but the title is telling, and true. Any number of dreams might go along 
with this music, but such particularity of intention is fantastic. If the point 
of Mahler's ode and the music were to "depict the movements, the very 
being, of the striving heart as ends in themselves" (637), something which 
"glorifies striving rather than promising the static possession of an object" 
(638), one would be tempted to ask of it "striving for what?" But as it is 
music, one does not respond to it as if it were a thesis or a judgment. 
Perhaps the emotions it elicits are otherwise also. 
NOTES 
1. Lodge, David, Thinks . .. (New York: Viking-Penguin, 2001), Pp. 69. 
Faith and Narrative, edited by Keith Yandell. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001, pp. 288. $52.00. 
KELLY CLARK, Calvin College 
Narrative is among the hottest topics in continental philosophy, ethics, lit-
erary theory, biblical studies, theology and any number of areas of human-
istic concern. The claims of narrativists run from the near-obvious (for 
example, history is best understood in a narrative context) to the highly 
controversial (the Biblical narrative clearly shows a God who forgets, gets 
angry and depends on human agents to accomplish God's purposes), to 
the outlandish (the self is a narration). We find narrative everywhere these 
days (everywhere, that is, except in analytic philosophy which has not paid 
